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ABSTRACT 
The amount of information to analyze in the decision-making process for 
command and control is increasing past human cognitive limits. The effects of 
augmenting human information processing with machine-processing capability are not 
fully understood. This research examined the interdependence between machine and 
human teammates and its impact on the current command and control structure. The 
experiment (2X4 repeated measures analysis) was conducted online utilizing 
Qualtrics and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Each of the 119 participants was asked 
a set of questions about 34 faces. Participants were asked to identify the category of 
the face and what reaction they would have, friendly or defensive. This question order 
was reversed and each of the questions was asked individually. This process was 
repeated while adding the assistance of a machine teammate. The machine 
teammate displayed a suggested answer to the first question that the human had 
to acknowledge before continuing to answer. 
This research is preliminary. However, conceptually, the additional 
communication between a human and machine teammate adds time into the command 
and control process. This interaction may also affect the decision maker by priming the 
human to an action or through automation bias. Furthermore, reducing information to the 
human in a human-machine team has significant potential to reduce team situational 
awareness. Follow-on research is needed before any conclusions can be reached. 
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The amount of data that are generated and collected is growing at increasing rates. 
In 2013, it was estimated that over 90% of the world’s data had been created in the last two 
years (Dragland, 2013). There is no shortage of publications promoting the use of computer 
system analytics (Elgendy & Elragal, 2014) and the value they add to decision-making by 
these computer-based decision support systems. The application of computer system 
analytics enables pattern recognition in large datasets that improves decision making 
(Henry & Venkatraman, 2015). A recent example of this is with the novel coronavirus 
(which causes the disease COVID-19). AI platform Bluedot was able to alert on the 
COVID-19 threat one week before national surveillance centers and the World Health 
Organization (Fitzpatrick et al., 2020). Advances in computer systems and analytical tools 
can empower military leaders to make faster decisions and to use various information 
fusion techniques for decision superiority in the big data era (Bean, 2016; Sayler, 2019). 
To make effective decisions in complex environments, a decision maker must have access 
to the most complete real-time information. We have the capability to collect this data from 
various platforms; for example, data for almost every mission and training exercise can be 
sent in near real time back to the command and control center (Sayler, 2019).  
The utility of analyzing large amounts of data with little or no delay is realized 
when otherwise, unrecognized patterns are incorporated into the decision-making process 
that eventually leads to making better decisions (Sayler, 2019). Most of the analysis is done 
by a human manually filtering and analyzing large volumes of data. As a result, processing 
large volumes of data can be time-consuming and inefficient. The ability to process large 
volumes of data expeditiously exceeds human information processing capabilities 
(Anastasia, 2015). Ergo, analysts are unable to keep pace with increasing volumes of data, 
and most importantly, potentially overlook the subtle but critical insights; as a result, 
mission-critical context-sensitive information can be missed. This research is important 
because it examines decision-making performance of human-machine teams at the 
confluence of the information processing, situational awareness, mutual trust, and risk; in 
doing so, the goal is to deliver a systemic perspective to the human machine team decision 
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making process. Since the future of command and control will depend on human-machine 
teams (HMT), it is imperative that the U.S. military understands the benefits, risks, and 
complexities associated with this revolution in the command and control paradigm. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
To maintain a relative advantage against our adversaries, we must leverage 
technological advances, such as AI, to support military operations in all war-fighting 
domains. Central to this endeavor is command and control, as Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication MCDP- 6 states, “No single activity in war is more important than command 
and control” (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC],1996, p. 35). The problem is that the amount of 
information required to analyze in the decision-making process is increasing past human 
cognitive limits. A machine teammate can mitigate this; however, this introduces new 
command and control issues related to situational awareness, mutual trust, prudent risk, 
and ultimately decision effectiveness, that we do not fully comprehend yet.  
B. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to examine the interdependence between machine 
and human teammates. This becomes critical to identify and mitigate new command and 
control issues that can emerge in situations in which orient of the Observe-Orient-Decide-
Act (OODA) loop or situational awareness (SA) constrains the team performance. For 
example, a service member has a machine teammate that starts to dominate his/her decision 
space. Although the information processing capability of the service member increases, the 
contextual SA can be suppressed. Hence, the decision comfort level of the service member 
may change, and the command and control related repercussion of this situation can affect 
shared awareness, mutual trust, and prudent risk, which are critical to effective command 
and control. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the new command and control issues that can arise in HMTs 
while the dominating decision makers vary?  
2. Does interaction with a machine affect the situation awareness? 
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3. H1: HMT will have greater decision effectiveness 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into four additional chapters. Chapter II is a literature 
review that investigates what makes up command and control, and briefly touches on 
models and theories. Chapter III describes the research methodology. It goes into details 
about the experimental design and how the experiment was conducted. Chapter IV presents 
the results of the experiment and goes into the analysis that was conducted. Finally, chapter 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The term command and control was not formally defined until the 20th century; 
however, it has been thought about and practiced for centuries (Alberts et al. 2010). Early 
command and control was a relatively simple task: the commander would be able to see all 
his forces and the entire battlefield. He would be able to direct and be involved in the 
action; thus, he would see the results (the consequences of his directions). This can be seen 
in the work of one of the most well-known military theorists, Carl von Clausewitz. In his 
famous book Vom Kriege (On War), Clausewitz stated “each commander can only fully 
know his own position; that of his opponent can only be known to him by reports. Which 
are uncertain” (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 9). Thus, control was limited to what the commander 
could see; essentially it was about the distance for visual and audio signals. This makes 
sense because in that era battlefields were generally small and well defined. Fighting was 
done with short-range weapons in large masses. Modern command and control draws its 
origins from Napoleon who is credited with the development of the first headquarters and 
staff (Alberts et al., 2010). Martin Van Creveld recognizes that commanding and 
controlling an armed force with effective communication is as old as war itself (Creveld, 
1987). As technology has increased so has the quest for information and certainty which 
leads to the problem of effective command and control. Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War:  
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory 
gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle. (Tzu, 2004, p. 15) 
Martin Van Creveld also recognizes this same point as a quest for certainty (Creveld, 
1987): 
[A quest for] certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy’s forces; 
certainty about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment 
in which the war is fought, from the weather and the terrain to radioactivity 
and the presence of chemical warfare agents; and, last but definitely not 
least, certainty about the state, intentions, and activities of one’s own forces. 
(Creveld, 1987, p. 264) 
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Modern warfare does not have the same luxuries as the past commanders had. Specifically, 
in the sense they could see and direct action. 
In 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry stated, “historically, an [revolution in 
military affairs] RMA occurs when the incorporation of new technologies into military systems 
combines with the innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptations to fundamentally 
alter the character and conduct of military operations.” (Perry, 1995). “Even the most casual glance 
at business history makes it clear each time a new information infrastructure becomes available 
(e.g., railroad, telegraph, telephone) the entities which are ultimately most successful are also the 
first to reshape their structures in order to gain maximum advantage of the new information 
conduits” (New Worlds Vistas, 1996). Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations states “Advances in 
information technology increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare.” Thus, a commander 
who is operating at a slower tempo is at a great disadvantage.  
The United States has sought to leverage technology two pervious times in an effort to 
offset the large buildup of forces its enemies have accumulated (Manea, n.d.). The first was in the 
1950s with President Eisenhower’s “New Look” (Manea, n.d.). The second came in the 1980s with 
Secretary Harold Brown promoting an “Offset strategy” (Manea, n.d.). As adversaries of the U.S. 
endeavored to close the gap formed by the “second Offset Strategy,” a need for a new strategy 
ensued. This was the beginning of the third offset strategy (Bertuca, 2014; Manea, n.d.). This 
strategy focuses on technologies such as: robotics, autonomously operated guidance and control 
systems, visualization, biotechnology, miniaturization, advanced computing and big data, advanced 
energetics, additive manufacturing, and 3D printing to gain an advantage (Host, 2015). In a 2015 
speech the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work, said that “we will use machines to help our 
decision-makers make better decisions” (Work, 2015). In order to effectively deploy machines as 
a means to improve decision processes in the military, the effects of machines on command and 
control must be understood.  
B. DOCTRINE AND DEFINITIONS 
1. Maneuver Warfare Doctrine 
The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare. In this context winning is 
contingent on maintaining quick, flexible plans; in doing so, adaptive behavior can be 
sustained in the complex battlefield especially important is time. To win, one must be able 
to generate a faster tempo than the enemy (USMC, 1996). Furthermore, to be successful in 
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maneuver warfare one must have speed and surprise in order to concentrate combat power 
at the right time at the decisive point. Speed is how rapid an action takes place (USMC, 
1997). “Speed over time is tempo” (USMC, 1997, p. 2-19). Absolute speed does not matter, 
it is your speed relative to the enemy. If you can act faster than the enemy then the enemy 
will be forced to react to your actions, thus gaining the initiative. Since speed is what 
matters, it follows that we should do everything we can to increase our speed of action 
without degrading the quality. One way to do this is through improved command and 
control operations with the use of machine teammates. 
War is a fluid battle of wills, during this battle many opportunities will present 
themselves but will be fleeting (MCDP 1, 1997). To be able to exploit these fleeting 
opportunities we must apply focus (MCDP 1, 1997). Focus applies to time and space, 
meaning we must be able to effect action at the right location at the right time (MCDP 1, 
1997). To be able to apply this focus we must be able to effectively command and control 
the force. 
2. Command and Control Definitions 
Command and control bestows the legal authority on the commander to give 
direction to all assigned forces (MAGTF Expeditionary Operations 8906, 2019). Command 
and control is the warfighting function that allows the other warfighting functions to be 
effective (MAGTF Expeditionary Operations 8906, 2019). According to MCDP 6 
[Command and Control] “No single activity in war is more important than command and 
control.” Furthermore, MCDP 1–2 [Campaigning] states “it [command and control] 
provides the intellectual framework and physical structures through which commanders 
transmit their intent and decisions to the force and receive feedback on the results.” 
Command and control by itself will not destroy a single enemy target or drive home a 
single attack (MCDP 6, 1996). “Yet none of these warfighting activities, would be possible 
without effective command and control” (MCDP 6, 1996). A comparison between how the 
Department of Defense and the other services define command and control can provide 
some insight to this concept. The Department of Defense (DOD) definition for command 
and control from the 2020 DOD dictionary of Military and associated terms: 
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The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander 
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 
Also called C2. (JP 1). (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
2020, p. 40) 
This serves as the foundation for the services, most have adopted this definition with a few 
exceptions. The Army defines command and control as: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander 
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 
1). (Headquarters, Depart of the Army [DOA], 2019, Glossary-2) 
The Navy definition is: 
Command and control enables the naval commander to understand the 
situation in his battlespace, select a course of action, issue intent and orders, 
monitor the execution of operations, and evaluate the results. It is the 
primary tool he uses to cope with the disorder and uncertainty of warfare. 
(Department of the Navy, 1955, p. 6) 
The Air Force adopts the original definition and adds to it: 
Command and control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission” (JP 1). C2 enables mission 
accomplishment by collaborative planning and synchronizing, integrating 
forces and operations in time and purpose. Fluid horizontal and vertical 
information flow enables effective C2 throughout the chain of command 
(U.S. Air Force [USAF], 2020, p. 69). 
Finally, the Marine Corps’ definition is: 
The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and 
sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. (MCDP 6, 1996, p.37) 
These definitions contain the necessary elements for successful command and 
control. In order to fully understand the command and control process it is important to 
understand the two components. The first is command, command bestows on the 
commander the legal authority to give directions to all assigned forces (MAGTF 
Expeditionary Operations 8906, 2019). Control is fundamentally part of command. Control 
allows a commander’s staff to monitor the status of command and ensure corrections are 
made where needed to align subordinates to the will of the commander (MAGTF 
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Expeditionary Operations 8906, 2019). These two concepts will be explored in detail in 
the next section. 
3. Command 
Vital to the understanding of command and control is the component of command. 
The 2020 DOD dictionary of Military and associated terms defines command as: 
1. The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises 
over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. 2. An order given by a 
commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of 
bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an 
area under the command of one individual. (DOD Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, 2020, p.40) 
From this definition it is clear the commander has been given authority to issues orders to 
bring about a particular action by individuals, a unit, or units. With authority also comes 
responsibility. Command has two parts: decision-making and leadership (MAGTF 
Expeditionary Operations 8906, 2019). Decision-making in this regard has two important 
components: choosing if a decision needs to be made and then when and what needs to be 
decided (MAGTF Expeditionary Operations 8906, 2019). Leadership, however, is about 
taking responsibility, being inspirational, and demonstrating physical and moral courage 
(MAGTF Expeditionary Operations 8906, 2019). Command can then be thought of as more 
of an art, assigning missions, prioritizing resources, providing guidance, and directing 
subordinates toward a single goal (Bornman, 1993). In the context of this thesis, the focus 
will be on the decision-making aspect of command. 
4. Control 
The 2020 DOD dictionary of Military and associated terms defines control as: 
1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander 
over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1) 3. 
Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an 
agent or group will respond as directed. (JP 3-0) (DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 2020, p.40)  
The second and fourth definitions were omitted because they deal with mapping and 
charting, and intelligence usage, which are not relevant to the context of this study. In the 
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DOD definition, the function of control is not elucidated. The U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command’s Command and Control Measures of Effectiveness Handbook’s 
definition of control is that  “Control is the science of defining limits, computing 
requirements, allocating resources, prescribing requirements for reports, monitoring 
performance, identifying and correcting deviations from guidance, and directing 
subordinate actions to accomplish the commander’s intent” (p. 15). Control by this 
definition exists because of command. It is there to regulate the forces in command. This 
is mainly done by a staff, but the commander is still vital to supervising control activities.  
C. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS 
The process of command and control is a collection of related activities (MCDP 6, 
1996). This process may contain procedures (a specific sequence of steps) but should not 
be thought of as one (MCDP 6, 1996). The basic elements of the command and control 
process are “people, information, and the command and control support structure” (MCDP 
6, 1996). It is people who act in the process, whereas the other parts exist to serve them. 
The process does not exist in isolation and external factors such as an enemy or other 
outside entity will affect the process and its effectiveness. Consequently, the quality of the 
process of command control becomes contingent on the people who are utilizing it. It is 
challenging to have these three components working in harmony where people understand 
the structure and how to optimize information flow while dealing with external factors. 
Furthermore, there are two salient concepts that constrain the process of the command and 
control, these are uncertainty and time. 
MCDP 6 (1996) states one purpose of command and control is to be able to reduce 
uncertainty in order to make the best decision available; Reducing uncertainty can be 
accomplished through increasing information. While MCDP 6 (1996) states the goal is to 
reduce uncertainty to zero, there will always be some information we lack. According to 
MCDP 6 (1996), uncertainty is defined as what is not known about a given situation. 
Certainty is therefore “a function of knowledge and understanding and not merely data” 
(MCDP 6, 1996). Where data is required for knowledge, more data does not equate to more 
knowledge (MDCP 6, 1996). These concepts will be discussed further in the information 
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topic. This is because knowledge is a cognitive process of adding meaning to information 
(MCDP 6, 1996). Additionally, some data may lead to more uncertainty (MCDP 6, 1996). 
The subtle point here is that uncertainty cannot be reduced simply by more data (MCDP 6, 
1996). More importantly, it is the quality and timing of the information and the willingness 
to accept a certain level of uncertainty while still making a decision (MCDP 6, 1996). This 
leads to the second major element that affects command and control, time.  
Time is the most important factor that affects successful command and control 
(MCDP 6, 1996). If uncertainty is a lack of information, then we can reduce uncertainty by 
gaining information (MCDP 6, 1996), which takes time to gain and process it (MCDP 6, 
1996). Having enough time, one would be able to reduce the amount of uncertainty to 
almost zero. This invokes three problems in a competitive environment. First, knowledge 
is perishable, as it takes time to gain and process information, the information that was 
previously gained becomes obsolete (MCDP 6, 1996). Second, no situation is static, a 
competitor is utilizing the same process and is therefore acting on a situation, changing it 
in the process (MCDP 6, 1996). Finally, the tempo of operations limits the amount of data 
that can be gathered and used before a decision must be made (MCDP 6, 1996). As a result, 
effective command and control then becomes an information race in which the winner will 
be who can gather, process, and act faster (MCDP 6, 1996). Hence, to win, a command a 
control system must be fast, faster than the enemy’s (MCDP 6, 1996). Furthermore, the 
time differential does not need to be vast (MCDP 6, 1996). The command and control 
system should be easily repeatable to take advantage of even a small-time advantage 
(MCDP 6, 1996). Thus, even a small advantage builds quickly over time so long as the 
process is easily repeatable (MCDP 6, 1996). The enduring point here is that is does not 
matter what advanced technology exists in some future time, but how well you deal with 
the fundamental problems of uncertainty and time (MCDP 6, 1996). Similarly, to achieve 
effective command and control the measure will be having the right information at the time 
to allow military forces to act faster than the enemy (MCDP 6, 1996).  
12 
1. People 
People are the essence of any command and control system (MCDP 6, 1996). 
People gather information, process that information, communicate, make decisions, and 
take actions (MCDP 6, 1996). The rest of the system is designed to help the humans 
improve their ability to command and control (MCDP 6, 1996). Humans have emotions 
such as fear, hope, fatigue, and others. Additionally, they have the capacity for judgment, 
intuition, and imagination (MCDP 6, 1996). Command and control must account for these 
unique human aspects because these aspects make command more an art than science 
(MCDP 6, 1996). However, with computers becoming more powerful and having better 
predictive algorithms, they can perform better than the human in specific situations. 
Examples include IBM’s Deep Blue computer which defeated chess champion Garry 
Kasparov in 1997 (Tegmark, 2017). Next, IBM’s Watson computer defeated Brad Rutter 
and Ken Jennings in Jeopardy in 2011 (Tegmark, 2017). In 2015, Google’s computer 
DeepMind was able to master dozens of Atari computer games by playing them and 
learning the controls by only given the objective of maximizing the score (Tegmark, 2017). 
Finally, in 2016 Google built AlphaGo, and defeated the 18-time world champion Lee 
Sedol (Tegmark, 2017). It is easy to see how powerful computers have become and why 
they have become an indispensable part of the command and control process.  
Another important aspect worth briefly exploring is human cognition as it relates 
to learning. Cognition is a complicated topic with many attempting to develop a unified 
theory of cognition (Chong, Wray, 2005). In the context of this study, cognitive behaviors 
research will be examined rather than exploring theories such as State, Operator And Result 
(SOAR), Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R), and Executive-Process 
Interactive Control (EPIC) (Chong, Wray, 2005). Learning is vital to cognition and 
therefore is an important element to consider when looking at the cognitive load capacity 
of a human (Collins, 2019) Learning is an active process that requires the new material to 
become integrated with existing knowledge you already have (Clark, 2008; Walcutt, 
Schatz, 2019). This can be done in different ways and there are generally three different 
views (IntroBooks, 2019; O’Donnell, Lawless, Sharp, O’Donnell, 2015). The three 
different views of learning are: the behavioral view, the cognitive view, and the 
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construction view (IntroBooks, 2019; O’Donnell, Lawless, Sharp, O’Donnell, 2015). Since 
learning requires information to be stored it makes sense that memory is the only way to 
justify that learning has occurred (Sprenger, 1999).  
Cognitive load is generally considered “the load that performing a particular task 
imposes on the cognitive system” (Sweller at al., 1998). This theory is basically stating that 
a human’s learning ability is severely hindered while solving difficult problems (Sweller 
at al., 1988). Cognitive load has two facets: mental load and mental effort (Sweller et al., 
1998). Mental load is “the load that is imposed by task demands” (Sweller et al., 1998). 
Mental effort is “the amount of cognitive capacity or resources that is actually allocated to 
accommodate the task demands” (Sweller et al., 1998). This concept has particular 
important implications when a large amount of information is being presented and then the 
human is asked to make decisions. Sweller et al. (2011) pointed to a study by Ayres (2001) 
that when decision making was at its highest intensity, error rates were at their highest, 
thus poor performance under a high cognitive load. One way to reduce the cognitive load 
of a human is to share the load with a machine. When sharing information with another 
human you are trusting what they are telling you is true. This is no different than with  
a machine. 
While trust is not a part of this experiment, it is still a vital piece of dealing with 
people. Trust is vital in a military context, and must exist between commanders, 
subordinates, and staffs (MCDP 6, 1996). Mutual trust is a function of familiarity and 
respects and effects cooperation and moral (MCDP 6, 1996). This is trust between people, 
but how does this change between man and machine? This is a very important question and 
should be thoroughly researched in future command and control systems dealing with 
machine teammates but falls outside the scope for this thesis. 
2. Information 
According to MCDP 6 (1996), information refers to representations of reality which 
we use to make decisions and take actions. Information in this sense takes the form of 
numbers, letters, symbols, images, that we use to represent things or ideas (MCDP 6, 1996). 
As a result, the process of command and control relies on information (MCDP 6, 1996). 
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To be able to control a situation, information must be collected, processed, interpreted, 
acted on, and shared with others. The value of information in the military context is 
accentuated in the context of time (MCDP 6, 1996). In order to make decisions faster than 
the enemy, speed matters. Therefore, if information describing a fleeting opportunity is not 
gained, processed, interpreted, acted on, and communicated with speed, the information 
becomes irrelevant at best and misleading at worst (MCDP 6, 1996).  
In this context there are two functions for information (MCDP 6, 1996). The first 
is to create situational awareness, the second is to direct and control actions (MCDP 6, 
1996). These two functions are not mutually exclusive as the same information can serve 
both purposes (MCDP 6, 1996). Information allows the commander to gain situational 
awareness, this in turn allows the commander to make decisions and communicate them 
(MCDP 6, 1996). Without this situational awareness, the commander will be unable to 
make a decision no matter how much previous experience they have (MCDP 6, 1996). This 
might imply that having more information will lead to a better decision (MCDP 6, 1996). 
This, however, is inaccurate. Most information will be irrelevant, and some will be 
inaccurate and even misleading when considering time as a critical factor (MCDP 6, 1996). 
Considering the rate at which technology continues to progress and the amount of data that 
is generated daily, there is a distinct danger of overwhelming a commander with too much 
information (MCDP 6, 1996). In this sense, too much information is just as detrimental to 
decision making as too little information (MCDP 6, 1996). The key is having the right 
information when needed in useful form not the amount (MCDP 6, 1996). The same 
technology that is generating and gathering this overwhelming amount of information can 
also help us process and sort it. Machines can process vastly more information than a 
human can. If we utilize these machines as teammates, we will be able to process and sort 
more information, looking for the right information in the right form delivered when it is 
needed than we could before. But what is the consequence of utilizing a machine teammate 
to assist in this process? Does it affect the decision-making process in humans?  
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3. Information Hierarchy 
According to MCDP 6 (1996), information has four levels ranging from data to 
understanding (see Figure 1) (MCDP 6, 1996). The lowest level is comprised of signals 
that have not yet “been processed, correlated, integrated, evaluated, or interpreted in any 
way” (MCDP 6, 1996). This is called raw data (MCDP 6, 1996). This level of data is not 
of much use until it goes through some transformation process (MCDP 6, 1996). The next 
level of the information hierarchy is processed data (MCDP 6, 1996). It is data that  
have undergone a process and is converted into a form that is understandable by people 
(MCDP 6, 1996). Examples of this are film, a computer file or image displayed on a  
screen (MCDP 6, 1996). This process may have limited value to people but falls short of 
being evaluated or analyzed (MCDP 6, 1996). The next level is knowledge (MCDP 6, 
1996). This is data that has been processed and analyzed to provide meaning (MCDP 6, 
1996). Knowledge has been screened based on its reliability, relevance, and importance 
(MCDP 6, 1996). Knowledge is then the synthesis of different pieces of information that 
have been screened to start building a picture of the situation (MCDP 6, 1996). The last 
and highest level is understanding (MCDP 6, 1996). Understanding results when we go 
through a similar process as in the knowledge level, we screen pieces of knowledge and 
synthesis the relevant pieces together (MCDP 6, 1996).  
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Figure 1. Information Hierarchy.  
Source: MCDP 6 (1996). 
There may be gaps in this synthesized picture, and we use our intuition and 
judgement to fill those gaps to get a complete mental image of the situation (MCDP 6, 
1996). Therefore, understanding equates to situational awareness (MCDP 6, 1996).  
The process of turning processed data into understanding is done through learning, 
or stated another way, through a cognitive process (Levis & Athans, 1987; MCDP 6, 1996). 
While a certain degree of this process will follow rules or logical processes, it is primarily 
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a human mental activity (MCDP 6, 1996). Through learning, humans can use their past 
experiences in the form of intuition and judgement to fill in knowledge gaps to gain 
situational awareness (MCDP 6, 1996). Endsley (1995) defined situational awareness as: 
the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status in the near future. (p. 36) 
This hierarchy can be thought of as a wide filter at the bottom (raw data) and narrow at the 
top (understanding) (MCDP 6, 1996). It is through this filtering the amount of raw data, 
processed data, and knowledge we get to understanding (MCDP 6, 1996). If this filter is 
too wide the commander at the top trying to make a decision will be inundated with 
information (MCDP 6, 1996). If the filter is too narrow the commander may be starved for 
information (MCDP 6, 1996). To adjust the filter, one has to adjust the knobs of time and 
effort (MCDP 6, 1996). Some of this cost in time and effort could be offloaded to a machine 
teammate to arguably keep the filter wide at the bottom and not be overloaded at the top.  
4. Communication of Information 
Communication is an important requirement for executing command and control 
effectively. There are three different types of communication channels (MCDP 6, 1996). 
Information can flow vertically, horizontally, or diagonally (MCDP 6, 1996). For example, 
in the vertical information flow, information vertically moves up and down in the chain of 
command (MCDP 6, 1996). In the case of horizontal information flow, information flows 
between units (MCDP 6, 1996). When information flows diagonally it is a combination of 
the two aforementioned channels. For example, a company talking to an adjacent battalion 
(MCDP 6, 1996). Information can flow in two different ways through these channels 
(MCDP 6, 1996). It can be informal or formal (MCDP 6, 1996). Informal information is 
information that is passed based on personal relationships vice formal information which 
is conveyed through official and professional relationships (MCDP 6, 1996). Moreover, 
people can communicate implicitly or explicitly (MCDP 6, 1996). Implicit communication 
is the ability to gain a mutual understanding while only transferring a small amount of 
information (MCDP 6, 1996). This is possible through familiarity and because of shared 
past experiences and a common outlook (MCDP 6, 1996). Explicit communication is fully 
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and clearly expressing something, transferring more information to ensure mutual 
understanding is achieved.  
5. Command and Control Support Structure 
In MCDP 6 (1996) the command and control support structure “aids people who 
create, disseminate, and use information” (p. 51). It continues that the command and 
control support structure “includes the organizations, procedures, equipment, facilities, 
training, education, and doctrine that support command and control” (p. 51). While we 
often think about effective command and control is a product of advanced technology such 
as communication and situational awareness software such as: satellite communications 
and the command post of the future software. MCDP 6 further states this does not guarantee 
effective command and control. Effective command and control first and foremost begin 
with good people (MCDP 6, 1996). It is with good people comes great guiding principles 
and philosophies (MCDP 6, 1996). 
6. Situational Awareness 
Mica Endsley (1995) states that it becomes more and more difficult to maintain 
situational awareness in a dynamic environment. She goes on to say that in dynamic 
environments complexity and the amount of interactions with the environment are high. 
She says “in dynamic environments, many decisions are required across a fairly narrow 
space of time, and tasks are dependent on an ongoing, up-to-date analysis of the 
environment. Because the state of the environment is constantly changing, often in 
complex ways, a major portion of the operator's job becomes that of obtaining and 
maintaining good SA” (p. 33). This SA is more than simply perceiving the environment 
but must add meaning to what is being perceived thereby gaining understanding (Endsley, 
1995). Another important element of SA is time. Endsley (1995) talks about how SA is not 
gained instantaneously, that it is acquired over time. SA is a “state of knowledge” (Endsley, 
1995, p. 36). 
Endsley (1995) explains that in her model she displays SA distinct from decision 
making (Figure 2). She continues that even the best decision maker will make a bad 
decision given inaccurate or incomplete SA. She points out the converse is also true, that a 
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decision maker with perfect SA can still make a bad decision. She also points out that 
attention, working memory, workload, and stress are separated as well because while they 
can interact with SA they are independent and can interact with SA. Endsley explains her 
SA model in three levels. Her level 1 deals with being able to “perceive the status, 
attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment” (p. 36). To achieve the 
next level, she states one must be able to combine level 1 elements that appear to be 
unrelated, that level 2 “goes beyond simply being aware of the elements” (p. 37). She says 
that it is with experience a decision maker is able to synthesize the various level 1 elements 
together to create a holistic picture. Finally, level 2 SA Endsley explains deals with the 
ability to project near future actions. This is done by combining both level 1 and level 2 
elements (Endsley, 1995). She uses an example of a fighter pilot to highlight what elements 
of each level are: 
a. Level I: location, altitude, and heading of ownship and other aircraft; 
current target; detections; system status; location of ground threats and 
obstacles 
b. Level 2: mission timing and status; impact of system degrades; time and 
distance available on fuel; tactical status of threat aircraft (offensive/ 
defensive/neutral) 
c. Level 3: projected aircraft tactics and maneuvers, firing position and 
timing. (Endsley, 1996, p. 38) 
Understanding SA is an important aspect of decision making, but how does having 
a machine teammate affect SA. Endsley (1995) provides some insight on how teams affect 
SA. She concluded that “the quality of team members' SA of shared elements (as a state of 
knowledge) may serve as an index of team coordination or human machine interface 
effectiveness” (p. 39). She also points out that as a member of the team you must maintain 
SA of your responsibilities or risk becoming the weak link. She uses an example of a pilot 
and copilot, if the copilot has perfect SA on something but the pilot does not then their 
shared SA will suffer. There must be a communication channel to transmit the information 
to have shared SA. Her model for team SA is depicted in Figure 3. This is important to 
decision making and command and control because Endsley (1995) points out that the 
context of a problem greatly affects the decision maker’s ability to adopt a problem-solving 
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strategy because they lack contextual information. Endsley (1995) states “In the absence 
of an appropriate model, people will often fail to solve a new problem, even though they 
would have to apply the same logic as that used for a familiar problem” (p. 39). 
 
Figure 2. The Three-Level Model of Situational Awareness.  
Adapted from Endsley (1996). 
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Figure 3. Team Situational Awareness. Source: Endsley (1995). 
An alternate view of SA comes from Smith and Hancock (1995), they describe SA 
as “externally, directed consciousness” that is an “invariant component in an adaptive cycle 
of knowledge, action and information” (p. 303). Their view was adapted from Niesser’s 
(1976) perceptual cycle model. This model viewed SA as how one interacted with the 
world and used these interactions to compare to internally held schemata (Endsley, 1995). 
The perceptual cycle happens because the interactions with the environment modifies the 
internally held schemata which in turn leads back to the environment for further exploration 
(Endsley, 1995). Smith and Hancock built upon this previous model, arguing that SA is 
built around mental models which contain expectations of certain situations (Endsley, 
1995). The expectations held within the mental models direct the individual to search for 
matching cues in the environment to inform their decision making (Endsley, 1995). If 
something unexpected is found, the individual seeks more information from the 
environment to update their mental model (Endsley, 1995). Smith and Hancock’s model is 




Figure 4. The Perceptual Cycle Model of Situational Awareness. 
Source: Smith and Hancock (1995). 
D. THEORY AND MODELS 
People make decisions in many different ways and use different mental tools when 
making decisions. Although it has been widely studied, and continues to be investigated, it 
may remain a mystery how exactly humans make decisions. Nevertheless, decision theory 
has come a long way in the last 100 years and has “uncovered substantial and systematic 
regularities in how people make decisions and has led to the formulation of general 
psychological principles that characterize decision-making behavior” (LeBoeuf & Shafir, 
2005). For a theory or model to be useful it must be able to explain widely observed 
properties and behaviors in their basic form, such as, fundamental components or concepts 
(Builder et al., 1999). While there are many ideas and different theories about decision 
making, only expected utility and expected value theories along with Boyd’s observe 
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orient, decide, and then act (OODA) model, the Lawson model, and the (Stimulus-
Hypothesis-Option-Response) SHOR model will be used in this research. Although there 
are a considerable number of recognized theories and models for decision making, they are 
not distinct from the ones chosen for this research. Other theories that were reviewed but 
will not be covered are: the economic human and rational man, naturalistic decision 
making, decision making under risk, routine decision making, and explanation based 
decision making (Simon, 1956; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; 
Persky, 1995; Hollnagel, 2007; Edwards, 2009). Similarly, other models that were 
reviewed but will not be covered are the recognition primed decision making model, the 
Critique-Explore-Compare-Adapt Loop, Plan-Do-Check-Act model that originated from 
Shewhart in 1939 and espoused by Demming in 1951, Rasmussen’s 1983 model of human 
thinking in supervisory control, and Klein’s 1998 model of recognition-primed decision-
making (Simon, 1956; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Persky, 
1995; Hollnagel, 2007; Edwards, 2009). 
1. Expected Value Theory 
Expected Value Theory (EVT) was originally designed for economics. EVT states 
“the expected value is the sum of possible outcomes weighted by their probabilities of 
occurrence” (LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2005). A decision maker that uses EVT is constrained by 
objective values put on each object by the decision maker (Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer, 
2008). This prevents the use of other outside information. For example, the cost of a new 
software package is higher than the cost of another, but the one that cost more provides 
interoperability with multiple other systems while the cheaper software does not. This 
limitation was acknowledged, and a new theory was formulated by Daniel Bernoulli in 
1738 called Expected Utility Theory (EUT) (Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer, 2008; LeBoeuf 
& Shafir, 2005). 
2. Expected Utility Theory 
EUT states that an option has different attributes and each attribute has a different 
amount of utility in which it helps to achieve the goals of the decision maker (Markman & 
Medin, 2002; Russell, 2019). Each one of these attributes has an importance and each 
24 
attribute is then weighted by the product of the utility value and the importance value 
(Markman & Medin, 2002; Russell, 2019). Hence, “the overall utility of an option is then 
the sum of the weighted utilities of the attributes” (Markman & Medin, 2002; Russell, 
2019). Stated another way, the decision maker cannot consider more than just the monetary 
value of an object. This means one could decide to realize a short-term loss for the benefit 
of the expected long-term gain (Edwards, 2009; Russell, 2019). Thus, the long-term gain 
can be said to have greater utility to the decision maker and are then willing to take a short-
term loss to realize the gain. However, utility is not well defined, and it is upon the decision 
maker to determine the importance of the components of the decision (Markman & Medin, 
2002). 
3. Models 
Decision making models are typically categorized into three different categories: 
normative models, descriptive models, and normative-descriptive models (Wohl et al., 
1983). Normative models by definition specify how decision should be made when the 
objectives are explicit (Wohl et al., 1983). Descriptive models aim to mimic human 
behavior in a non-human way and are used when decisions are repeatable (Wohl et al., 
1983). Finally, Normative-descriptive models strive to find an optimal solution but are 
constrained by cognition and neuromotor limitations (Wohl et al., 1983). The normative-
descriptive models will be explored in greater detail.  
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Figure 5. Types of Models. 
Source: Wohl et al. (1983). 
4. OODA Loop 
One of the most widely recognized and popular models for the command and 
control process is the OODA loop developed by Colonel John Boyd. This OODA cycle 
happens continuously; thus, it is called the OODA loop. The basic concept of this model is 
to make a decision, the decision maker must first observe what is happening, orient on what 
is being observed to what is known, past experiences, and the context the observations are 
in, make a decision based on that orientation, and finally act to implement a decision. Once 
complete the loop begins again. One of the most profound implications of this model is 
that whoever can complete the loop faster has an advantage over their opponent. This is 
because if you can complete the loop faster than your adversary, you will be able to react 
to changing situations more quickly and gain the initiative.  
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Figure 6. Boyd’s OODA Loop. 
Source: Boyd (1999). 
The OODA loop is happening at all levels of command, each having their own loop, 
each going through them simultaneously. Each going through the cycle at different rates, 
each constrained by the loop below it that is feeding data higher. The same is true from 
higher in the form of action decisions being transmitted in the form of data lower. Data 
flows up and down the levels of command. It is important to highlight the only thing that 
gets transmitted is data, each level must digest that data and does not gain understanding 
until it is interpreted during the orientation stage. 
5. A Deeper Look into the OODA Loop 
To obtain a better understanding of the OODA loop process, Roman (1997) 
believes it can be explored as two processes instead of one. He states the first process is 
the information gathering cycle. He goes on to say the second process is the decision-
making cycle. He continues by asserting the first process is trying to answer the question 
“What is actually happening?”, while the second process tries to answer, “what can I or 
should I do about it?”. The information gathering process of this simplified model includes 
observation and orientation functions, while the decision-making cycle includes the 
decision and action functions (Roman, 1997). Consider a commander who has very good 
information gathering capability but is either unwilling or unable to make a decision 
(Roman, 1997). This means that his ability to observe and orient are high, but his ability to 
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make a decision and act are not (Roman, 1997). This suggests an imbalance in the two 
cycles, the information cycle is working faster than the decision-making cycle (Roman, 
1997). In this example, the commander’s uncertainty may be low but because of the 
commander’s inability to make a decision and act and utilize his control process to 
distribute such action the subordinates will suffer (Roman, 1997).  
Now, consider the opposite situation, a commander who decides and acts but has 
poor information gathering capability (Roman, 1997). In this situation, it would mean that 
the decision-making cycle is operating faster than the information gathering cycle (Roman, 
1997). This commander uses what little information is available to still make a decision 
and act on it (Roman, 1997). Even if the commander makes decisions and act in this type 
of uncertainty eventually, they will make poor decision based on little information (Roman, 
1997). In this situation the people who follow the commander will suffer (Roman, 1997).  
These examples indicate that there must be balance between information gathering 
and decision making which define the commanders operating tempo (Roman, 1997). As 
Boyd has pointed out the goal is to conduct the OODA loop faster than the adversary. To 
do this effectively the commander must have a balance between gathering information and 
making a decision (Roman, 1997). Technology can speed up the amount of and type of 
information that is being gathered (Roman, 1997). However, as we have seen more 
information does not necessarily lead to better decisions (Roman, 1997). Realistically, the 
system will never be in perfect harmony (Roman, 1997). The commander will have to make 
a decision on less than perfect information and sometimes the commander will have to 
make a decision while being inundated with too much or conflicting information (Roman, 
1997). It is important to point out that technology can help gather information and it can 
help to sort that information and suggest possible courses of action. The technology does 
little good if the systems are not balanced. Stated another way, we must be very careful of 
technology that focus on one area over the other.  
A good example of this is in the ratio of radios to men from World War II to the 
Vietnam war. During World War II there was one radio for every 38.6 men (Van Creveld, 
1987). This number rose to one radio for every 4.5 men in Vietnam (Van Creveld, 1987). 
This was an 857 percent increase (Van Creveld, 1987). Furthermore, Campen, in The First 
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Information War, points out that “During Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. military had a 
98 percent communications reliability rate in handling 700,000 telephone calls, 700,000 
messages per day, and over 30,000 radio frequencies.” As technology has shortened the 
time for commanders to gather information it has also decreased the time to make a 
decision as well as our reliance on technology to support the increase in speed see Table 1 
(Roman, 1997). 
Table 1. Tempo and Command. 
Source: Roman (1997). 
 
 
The time between information gathering a decision-making is being compressed so 
much they are near simultaneous. With near real-time information gathering the 
commander must make decisions quickly or risk being outpaced by his adversary. So, 
decision makers must rely on technological tools to assist them in gathering and processing 
information. But, by using these tools do they alter the decision-making process in an 
unintended way? A March 2019 study from the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) found 
that machines can sense more from the environment, and sense better than humans and 
they can also take that information and act faster than humans (Center for Naval Analysis 
[CNA], 2019). Thus, applying Col. John Boyd’s OODA Loop as a framework, the 
machines performing better at the observe and act stages (CNA, 2019). However, humans 
dominate orientation, humans are better at understanding the context of a situation (CNA, 
2019). The decision step can be left to either the human or the machine (CNA, 2019).  
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6. Lawson’s Model 
The Lawson model (Figure 7) was developed by Joel S. Lawson Jr. in the 1970s 
(Levis & Athans, 1987). Two important differences between this model and the OODA 
model were the introduction of the desired state and interaction with the environment 
(Brehmer, n.d.; Coakley, 1993; Levis & Athans, 1987). The OODA model is representative 
of what people do. The Lawson model is representative of the environment, people 
inclusive (Brehmer, n.d.). Coakley (1993) states that the Lawson model has “five functions: 
sense, process, compare, decide, and act” (p. 32). He explains the sense function gathers 
data on the environment, this includes friendly, enemy, terrain, weather, etc. He continues 
to explain the process function combines and correlates the data to produce information for 
the commander about the environment. He describes how the compare function relates the 
existing environment with to desired state regarding relative strengths, weaknesses, 
positions etc. He further describes the decide function as it “chooses between the available 
courses of actions for reconciling the existing state of the environment with the desired 
state” (p. 33). Finally, he adds the act function converts “the decision into action” (p. 33). 
Hughes added to the Lawson cycle by correcting what he called “one of the flagrant 
deficiencies of Lawson’s 1977 model was that it originally treated control as a one-sided 
process” (Hughes, 2000). He addressed this by adding the interaction between friendly and 




Figure 7. Lawson’s Model. 
Source: Brehmer (n.d.). 
 
Figure 8. The Hughes/Lawson Model. 
Source: Hughes (2000). 
7. Wohl’s SHOR Model 
Another example of a decision-making model is Joseph Wohl’s stimulus-
hypothesis-option-response (SHOR) model (Figure 9). This model differs from Lawson’s 
model in that it attempts to account for psychological entities (Brehmer, n.d.). The stimulus 
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process gathers, filters, aggregates, and stores data (Grant & Kooter, 2005). The hypothesis 
process creates, evaluates, and selects a hypothesis based on the situation (Grant & Kooter, 
2005). The option process creates, evaluates, and selects a response (Grant & Kooter, 
2005). Finally, the response process plans, organizes, and executes the response (Grant & 
Kooter, 2005). The key result of this model and Wohl’s 1981 paper were the divergence 
between models and that of decision making in reality (Grant & Kooter, 2005).  
 
Figure 9. Wohl’s SHOR Model. 
Source: Brehmer (n.d.). 
The effectiveness of the model is based on perspective. These different models 
highlight important issues in the study of command and control. Boyd’s OODA model is 
a relatively simple model that focuses on making decisions faster than an adversary. 
Lawson’s model is slightly more complex and focuses on the environment and the 
interactions with it. Wohl’s model introduces psychological aspects of the decision-making 
process. All the processes are subject to the impact of information technology and 
uncertainty in the environment.  
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E. RISKS 
While it may seem that faster and improved technology may be the answer to 
increased speed, it requires careful consideration to adapt new technologies. Technology 
can be part of the problem. As it has been stated earlier, there is a limit to how much 
information a human can absorb in a given amount of time and situation. If technology is 
saturating a human decision maker with more information that they are able to process it 
can lead to information overload (MCDP 6, 1996). Furthermore, this can lead to the illusion 
that certainty and precision is attainable and decision paralysis can set in (MCDP 6, 1996).  
Another risk lies in the complexity of the system (MCDP 6, 1996). As the system 
increases in complexity it increases its attack surfaces, having more areas an adversary can 
infiltrate, disrupt, or monitor (MCDP 6, 1996). Furthermore, as complexity increases so 
does the opportunity for humans to not understand how the system works (MCDP 6, 1996). 
This is sometimes called a black-box system, where it receives an input and mysteriously 
does some calculations, and then provides an output. These types of systems can lead to a 
lack of trust in the human teammate because they do not fully understand the reasoning, 
programming, behind the system. Another risk is becoming overly reliant on technology 
(MCDP 6, 1996). The more humans rely on systems to do work for us the danger comes in 
skill atrophy (MCDP 6, 1996). If humans stop using certain skills for a long enough time, 
while relying on a machine teammate to do the work, when the machine no longer works, 
either by attack or through failure, humans may not be able to quickly reproduce what the 
systems was doing (MCDP 6, 1996). This leads into another risk, which is systems failure 
(MCDP 6, 1996).  
No matter how well a system is designed, it can still have internal failures, or bugs 
in the system. These may not be discovered until it is too late. A great example of this was 
occurred on 4 June 1996 with the launch of the unmanned Ariane 5 rocket launched by the 
European Space Agency (Tegmark, 2017). The ARIANE 5 Flight 501 injury board 
concluded that the rocket exploded after about 37 after launch because of a software bug. 
The report specified, “The internal SRI [Inertial Reference System] software exception was 
caused during execution of a data conversion from 64-bit floating point to 16-bit signed 
integer value. The floating point number which was converted had a value greater than 
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what could be represented by a 16-bit signed integer.” Finally, any mechanical system has 
the possibility of mechanical breakdown (MCDP 6, 1996). Where this can easily be 
mitigated though redundant systems, it is none the less is still a risk. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Data will be collected through the conduct of the experiment. The experimental 
design for this study is a 2X4 repeated-measures analysis (Table 2). The experiment 
includes one procedure, and each participant participated in all of the trials. The 2X4 design 
allowed us to study the variation of the probabilistic decision making between tasks with 
the condition of having a machine assistant and not having a machine assistant. 
Table 2. Experimental Design 
Team Condition Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 
Human only D-only C-only C-D D-C 
Human and 
Machine 
M-D M-C M-C-D M-D-C 
 
Table (2) Experimental design matrix. D=Decision, C=Categorization, M=Machine 
 
This research approach studied command and control issues in the HMT with 
human subject experimentation. Conducting this experiment allowed us to develop a 
theoretical understanding of the new command and control issues in HMTs. Specifically, 
this design can be used to study the inadvertent decision dominance within the same 
echelon decision makers who have different command and control responsibilities. By 
doing so, theoretical requirements can be comprehensively captured and used to improve 
context sensitive SA which includes the orient step of the OODA loop. The human subject 
experimentation included a time pressure in decision-making paradigm. The manipulation 
the participants performed was decisions making tasks with a machine teammate and 
without a machine teammate to simulate the following decision procedure: perceive 
 interact  decision vs. perceive  decision (Wang & Busemeyer, 2016). In doing 
so, we tested whether an interaction between a machine and the human might distort the 
SA. The significance of this distortion is that it is not the final decision. Thus, any impact 
at this stage of the human SA can give rise to command and control problems. The 
36 
participants answered questions regarding the tasks that they completed. The experimental 
work was completed on-line via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
B. CONDUCT OF EXPERIMENT 
This experiment follows on previous work done by James Townsend, Kam Silva, 
Jesse Spence-Smith, and Michael Wenger in their paper Exploring the relations between 
categorization and decision making with regard to realistic face stimuli published in 
Pragmatics and Cognition in 2000, Jerome Busemeyer, Zheng Wan, Ariane Lambert-
Mogiliansky in their paper “Empirical Comparison of Markov and Quantum Models of 
Decision Making” published in the Journal of Mathematical Psychology in 2009, and by 
Zheng Wang and Jermoe Busemeyer in their paper “Interference Effects of Categorization 
on Decision Making,” published in Cognition in 2016. The same head shots from these 
previous works were used in this study. These heads shots were taken from the book Heads 
by Alex Kayser. This book has pictures of 184 different faces. These pictures were all taken 
from the same distance with the same lighting conditions (Kayser, 1997). Additionally, all 
the selected faces used in this experiment were bald with no facial hair or facial jewelry. 
The faces were separated into two categories the “Jekos” and “Kekos.” The names were 
modified from a previous experiment and hold no specific meaning. 
1. ImageJ 
After choosing the faces for the experiment, the first step was to measure facial 
features; in doing so, the faces were put into two distinct categories using quantitative 
values. This measurement process is unique to this research. The goal of the research is to 
understand subtle effects of human machine communication. Since machines typically 
provide decision support with a certain accuracy, in addition to putting faces into two 
categories, the measurements were used in the rational design of the machine teammates.  
The program used for these measurements was ImageJ. ImageJ is an open source program 
created for use in life sciences (Schindelin et al., 2015). Scientists, hobbyists, and students 
use the program on a daily basis for data visualization, advanced image processing, and 
statistical analysis (Schindelin et. al., 2015). While it got its start in biomedical imaging 
processing and analysis it works perfectly for the type of image analysis we needed for this 
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experiment (Schindelin et. al., 2015; Schneider et al., 2012). We used this software 
combined with the book Facial Geometry by Robert M. George. Specifically, from this 
book, two ratios for facial dimensions were adapted in the measuring process of this study. 
The first one is the facial length index (see Figure 10); the second, is the labial index  
(see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 10. Facial Length Diagram. Source: Kayser (1997). 
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Table 3. Facial Length Index. Source: George (2007). 
 
 
Figure 11. Labial Diagram Source: Kayser (1997). 
Wide Face Normal Range Narrow Face
Males 83.30 83.40-93.60 93.70
Females 81.40 81.50-90.86 90.97
Facial Length Index
(n-gn/zy-zy x 100)
This index measures the length of the face relative to its width
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Table 4. Labial Index Source: George (2007). 
 
 
These two ratios provided a quantitatively generalizable way of distinguishing the 
heads into two distinct categories  
As the first step, the facial length and labial indexes of all the available heads in 
Alex Kayser’s book were measured. While some of the faces naturally fell within each 
category there were some that did not fall within the facial and labial index criteria of the 
experimental categories. As a result, some features of the faces were manipulated (Table 
5). Most of the Jeko faces fell naturally into their category without a lot of manipulation. 
The Keko faces were a different story. After measuring and analyzing all the facial ratios 
the faces with the fewest number of stand deviations from the desired criteria were selected. 
The faces were then manipulated using Adobe Photoshop. Once the manipulations were 
completed the faces were then remeasured to ensure they fell within the desired facial and 
labial range. Additionally, the manipulations were done to ensure the face was within one 
standard deviation of the desired criteria. While some faces naturally were greater than one 
standard deviation none were manipulated to an extreme. After conducting manipulations 
and measurements, two distinct categories were identified to conduct this study. These two 
categories are faces with wide facial length with thin lips, and faces with was narrow facial 
length with thick lips (Table 6). 
Thin-lipped Medium Thickness Thick-lipped
Males / Females 34.90 35.00-44.90 45.00




Table 5. Pre-manipulation Measurements 
Head # ZY-ZY N-GN Face Ratio LS-LI CH-CH Labial Ratio Face Lips Lip Face Category
7 1796 1448 80.62360802 624 104 16.66666667 Wide Thin Jeko
23 1728 1408 81.48148148 596 168 28.18791946 Wide Thin Jeko
24 1676 1452 86.63484487 524 68 12.97709924 Normal Thin 1 Std Jeko
26 1652 1352 81.8401937 500 172 34.4 Wide Thin Jeko
43 1804 1432 79.37915743 604 160 26.49006623 Wide Thin Jeko
45 2012 1548 76.93836978 636 116 18.23899371 Wide Thin Jeko
46 1820 1468 80.65934066 612 136 22.22222222 Wide Thin Jeko
50 1776 1468 82.65765766 564 148 26.24113475 Wide Thin Jeko
52 1688 1344 79.62085308 560 180 32.14285714 Wide Thin Jeko
57 1832 1512 82.53275109 656 116 17.68292683 Wide Thin Jeko
63 1820 1400 76.92307692 556 168 30.21582734 Wide Thin Jeko
64 1712 1296 75.70093458 592 80 13.51351351 Wide Thin Jeko
67 1752 1364 77.85388128 588 140 23.80952381 Wide Thin Jeko
68 1640 1400 85.36585366 560 92 16.42857143 Normal Thin 1 Std Jeko
82 1764 1428 80.95238095 588 156 26.53061224 Wide Thin Jeko
86 1654 1340 81.01571947 576 104 18.05555556 Wide Thin Jeko
90 1656 1448 87.43961353 540 68 12.59259259 Normal Thin 1 Std Jeko
Head # ZY-ZY N-GN Face Ratio LS-LI CH-CH Labial Ratio Face Lips Lip Face Category
1 1720 1596 92.79069767 584 264 45.20547945 Normal Thick 1 Std Keko
2 1652 1420 85.95641646 540 236 43.7037037 Normal Medium 1 Std 2 Std Keko
5 1660 1392 83.85542169 604 220 36.42384106 Normal Medium 4 Std 2 Std Keko
11 1652 1472 89.10411622 560 228 40.71428571 Normal Medium 2 Std 1 Std Keko
12 1684 1532 90.97387173 560 228 40.71428571 Normal Medium 2 Std 1 Std Keko
14 1584 1352 85.35353535 516 188 36.43410853 Normal Medium 4 Std 2 Std Keko
15 1672 1484 88.75598086 569 256 44.99121265 Normal Thick 1 Std Keko
17 1708 1448 84.77751756 552 208 37.68115942 Normal Medium 3 Std 2 Std Keko
18 1608 1496 93.03482587 528 204 38.63636364 Normal Medium 3 Std 1 Std Keko
19 1680 1468 87.38095238 480 208 43.33333333 Normal Medium 1 Std 2 Std Keko
25 1624 1436 88.42364532 576 236 40.97222222 Normal Medium 2 Std 2 Std Keko
31 1652 1476 89.34624697 596 216 36.24161074 Normal Medium 4 Std 1 Std Keko
38 1692 1432 84.63356974 548 216 39.41605839 Normal Medium 3 Std 2 Std Keko
39 1724 1388 80.51044084 588 220 37.41496599 Wide Medium 3 Std 3 Std Keko
55 1740 1500 86.20689655 504 200 39.68253968 Normal Medium 3 Std 2 Std Keko
80 1612 1524 94.54094293 508 216 42.51968504 Narrow Medium 1 Std Keko
85 1556 1452 93.31619537 624 284 45.51282051 Normal Thick 1 Std Keko
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Table 6. Post-manipulation Measurements 
 
Heads # ZY-ZY N-GN Face Ratio LS-LI CH-CH Labial IndeFace Lips Lip Face Category
7 1796 1448 80.62361 624 104 16.66667 Wide Thin Jeko
23 1728 1408 81.48148 596 168 28.18792 Wide Thin Jeko
24 Edit 1812 1496 82.56071 524 68 12.9771 Wide Thin Jeko
26 1652 1352 81.84019 500 172 34.4 Wide Thin Jeko
43 1804 1432 79.37916 604 160 26.49007 Wide Thin Jeko
45 2012 1548 76.93837 636 116 18.23899 Wide Thin Jeko
46 1820 1468 80.65934 612 136 22.22222 Wide Thin Jeko
50 1776 1468 82.65766 564 148 26.24113 Wide Thin Jeko
52 1688 1344 79.62085 560 180 32.14286 Wide Thin Jeko
57 1832 1512 82.53275 656 116 17.68293 Wide Thin Jeko
63 1820 1400 76.92308 556 168 30.21583 Wide Thin Jeko
64 1712 1296 75.70093 592 80 13.51351 Wide Thin Jeko
67 1752 1364 77.85388 588 140 23.80952 Wide Thin Jeko
68 Edit 1760 1412 80.22727 560 92 16.42857 Wide Thin Jeko
82 1764 1428 80.95238 588 156 26.53061 Wide Thin Jeko
86 Edit 1784 1416 79.3722 576 104 18.05556 Wide Thin Jeko
90 Edit 1832 1452 79.25764 540 68 12.59259 Wide Thin Jeko
Heads # ZY-ZY N-GN Face Ratio LS-LI CH-CH Labial IndeFace Lips Lip Face Category
1 Edir 1648 1608 97.57282 564 268 47.51773 Narrow Thick Keko
2 Edir 1500 1440 96 504 236 46.8254 Narrow Thick Keko
5 Edit 1476 1420 96.20596 548 248 45.25547 Narrow Thick Keko
11 Edit 1508 1468 97.34748 540 244 45.18519 Narrow Thick Keko
12 Edit 1584 1516 95.70707 576 264 45.83333 Narrow Thick Keko
14 Edit 1424 1360 95.50562 456 212 46.49123 Narrow Thick Keko
15 Edit 1564 1496 95.65217 569 256 44.99121 Narrow Thick Keko
17 Edit 1552 1480 95.36082 504 236 46.8254 Narrow Thick Keko
18 Edit 1472 1460 99.18478 492 224 45.52846 Narrow Thick Keko
19 Edit 1480 1452 98.10811 476 216 45.37815 Narrow Thick Keko
25 Edit 1512 1424 94.17989 548 256 46.71533 Narrow Thick Keko
31 Edit 1536 1464 95.3125 600 272 45.33333 Narrow Thick Keko
38 Edit 1556 1492 95.88689 580 264 45.51724 Narrow Thick Keko
39 Edit 1520 1428 93.94737 532 248 46.61654 Narrow Thick Keko
55 Edit 1596 1504 94.23559 504 236 46.8254 Narrow Thick Keko
80 Edit 1612 1524 94.54094 508 232 45.66929 Narrow Thick Keko
85 Edit 1512 1488 98.4127 624 284 45.51282 Narrow Thick Keko
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2. Photoshop 
To manipulate the images, first the file types were adjusted such that the file type 
supports the use of Face-Aware Liquify function of Adobe Photoshop. This was a simple 
procedure which was completed by selecting the image and choosing RGB color from the 
available modes; following this, filter and liquify was selected. This would bring the image 
up in a separate editing screen with the Face-Aware Liquify function. This tool allows 
manipulation of head measurements and specific facial features. The face and labial 
features that were manipulated were the upper lip, lower lip, chin height, jaw line, and face 
width. The upper lip, lower lip, and face width were the predominant features adjusted; 
only a small number of faces required chin height and jaw line manipulations. Once the 
manipulations were complete, all the new head pictures were remeasured by using ImageJ; 
in doing so, the manipulations and adjustments were checked with the index ratios to ensure 
enough adjustments were made to fall into the desired categories. Once the face had the 
desired index measurements and was saved the photos appeared whitewashed. To correct 
this issue the levels of the image were adjusted such that they are not appeared as washed 
out. This was done by selecting the adjustments tab and clicking the levels icon. Each photo 
was adjusted to a tone input level of .44. Each head that was manipulated was done so not 
to exceed one standard deviation above the categorical threshold for both the Facial Length 
Index and Labial Index.  
3. Experiment Setup 
The experiment setup was based on the previous work done in 2000 by Townsend 
et. al., the work done in 2009 by Busemeyer et. al., and the work done in 2016 by Wang 
and Busemeyer. The same idea of two distinct categories of people from a different planet 
was used. Additionally, a fictitious scenario was used which enlisted the help of our 
participants to categorize the two different people. For the experiment we broke away from 
the previous experiments and used a different naming convention for our fictitious people. 
We used “Jeko” and “Keko” instead of “Adok” and “Lork.” We did this to simplify the 
participants’ response process since we would be conducting our experiment via a web 
platform vice conducting it in person as it has been previously done. We kept the decision 
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action the same as was previously done as being either friendly or defensive. We kept the 
same face features to distinguish between the two different people. The Jekos tend to have 
round faces and thin lips, and the Kekos tend to have narrow faces with thick lips.  
4. Qualtrics 
To facilitate a wide range of participants and to quickly gather data it was decided 
to conduct the experiment online through MTurk. The program that was used to create the 
experiment is called Qualtrics. While creating the experiment in Qualtrics java script was 
added to each question to hide the next button so the only two buttons displayed were the 
response buttons. Additionally, java script was added to submit the response when the 
button was click vice having to select the response then have to click an additional button 
to submit the response. We made this decision due to the limited amount of time given for 
each question and wanted to avoid a response being selected but not being recorded 
because of the additional time to make additional mouse movements and clicks. Timing 
was added to each question to limit the amount of time each participant had to respond to 
10 seconds. When the time limit was reached the form would auto submit with no response 
recorded. Timing was also added to auto advance after three seconds once feedback was 
displayed. Display logic was used to ensure accurate feedback was given based on the 
response. Page breaks were used to separate question and timing blocks. To ensure a wider 
range of screen resolutions could see the question and responses without having to scroll 
down we changed the minimum width to 800 pixels. This increased the chance that 
someone on a laptop computer with a different screen resolution would have the same view 
as someone on a desktop computer. Additionally, we did not change the optimization for 
viewing on a mobile device. 
After the participants consented to the experiment, they were given the following 
set of instructions: 
You have been selected by the IBI (Interstellar Bureau of Investigation) to 
travel to the planet Camdere to find out more about two colonies, the Jekos 
and the Kekos. As you interact with the two colonies, you will be first asked 
to categorize each face as either a ‘Jeko’ or a ‘Keko.’ 
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The Jekos tend to have round faces and thin lips, and the Kekos tend to have 
narrow faces with thick lips. But this is not absolute! As in any culture, there 
is cross-over. A face with the features of a Jeko may actually be a Keko, 
and a face with the features of a Keko may actually be a Jeko.   
You have up to 10 seconds to view each face (you may answer before the 
10 seconds are up). You should click the ‘Jeko’ button for Jeko or click the 
‘Keko’ for Keko. Then, you have a choice to make, you can be friendly or 
defensive to the face. Jekos have the tendency to be friendly while Kekos 
tend to be hostile. This is not absolute! Since you do not know how the 
individual will act towards you, make your decision carefully. You should 
click the ‘friendly’ button to be friendly or click the ‘defensive’ button to 
be defensive. Again, you have up to 10 seconds to make the decision.   
Additionally, you may be partnered with a machine teammate to assist you. 
The machine teammate is highly accurate in its analysis. The machine 
teammate will display a categorization, or an action based on its analysis. 
You will be asked to acknowledge the categorization by clicking the 
acknowledge button. Then, the procedure follows the same as before.  
You will be given feedback for three seconds on your categorization and 
action decision after each face. After three seconds you will be presented 
with the next face. 
The participants were then led through four training rounds of four faces each. The training 
was meant to familiarize the participants with the format and flow of the experiment. The 
training began by asking only one question and providing feedback on a separate screen 
without a time limit (Figure 12). The next part of training added both a categorization 
question and decision question with a time limit. The third training block introduced the 
machine teammate and only asked one question without a time limit. Finally, the 
participant was given a machine teammate and asked both a categorization question and 
decision question with a time limit (Figure 13). The experiment then progressed through 
each of the tasks as stated before. 
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The feedback is displayed on a different screen but for simplicity they have been combined. 




The acknowledgement is displayed on a different page from the Jeko or Keko Question. 
Additionally, the friendly or defensive appears separately after answering the first question. 
Finally, the feedback is displayed on another page after answering the previous question. 
Figure 13. Example Display with Feedback 
Randomization 
The randomization was done using Excel. The probabilities were replicated from 
the earlier work of Townsend, Silva, Spencer-Smith, and Wenger (2000). The probability 
for the face category type and action type were fixed for this experiment. For example, of 
the 34 faces half were Keko and the other were Jeko. Of the 17 Keko faces, a randomly 
selected 60% were assigned to be hostile (bad guy category), and of those selected faces a 
randomly selected 70% were assigned to be hostile (hostile action). The remaining faces 
were assigned to be friendly (friendly action) see figure 14. Of the remaining 40% that was 
assigned friendly (good guy category), 70% were randomly assigned to be friendly 
(friendly action), the remaining were hostile (hostile action). The same logic is applied to 
the 17 Jeko faces except the percentages are reversed for hostile (bad guy category) and 
friendly (good guy category), 40% and 60%, respectively. Once each group of faces had 
been randomly assigned to a category and action they were combined and the order to 




Figure 14. Randomization Diagram. 
Source: Townsend, Silva, Spencer-Smith, and Wenger (2000). 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The 34 faces that were used to conduct the experiment were tested to see if they do 
in fact fall into two distinct categories. The faces were correctly identified 92% of the time. 
While 100% was the goal the faces are distinct enough to be correctly identified above 
90% of the time is sufficient for the conduct of the experiment. One potential explanation 
for not getting 100% was due to the small variation that some of the faces had done to them 
that put then within one standard deviation inside their group. This small difference may 
have given confusion on occasion. However, this was done by design to have minimal 
manipulations to replicate a real scenario where a computer would be able to calculate 
more data points than a human to recognize subtle differences that a human might not. This 
gives merit to the design of utilizing a machine teammate to assist in decision making. 
After the experiment was conducted 119 responses were collected. This was fewer 
than was expected but the experiment was cut short due to lag issues from the hosting 
server. Several respondents expressed there was a significant amount of time between 
clicking a response button and the response from the website. Due to this issue the survey 
was taken down before all the desired number of responses were collected. However, there 
were still 119 people that were able to complete the survey. Of the 119 participants 58 were 
male and 60 were female and one preferred not to answer. The average age was 42 with a 
minimum of 21 and a maximum of 77.  
A statistical analysis was not conducted due to time constraints. The data required 
a significant amount of cleaning due to lag issues. This lag resulted in several questions 
being left blank. During the coding process a blank response was considered an incorrect 
response and coded the same. This was done to account for those unable to answer within 
the time limit. The amount of unanswered questions was significant in some participants 
which brought the overall correct percentage down in the HMT. The data would need to 
be further inspected and cleaned to possible gain a different result. Additionally, the 
experiment may be run again with mitigations put into place to reduce to possibility of 
unanswered questions because of technical problems vice inability to make a decision 
within the allotted time. 
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A. NEW COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES 
An interaction with a machine teammate may not be considered as communication; 
however, interacting with a machine can have the same impact on the decision as in the 
case of communicating to a human. Secondly, having a machine teammate introduces a 
new communication channel into the command and control process. For information to 
flow through this new channel may take time. Although the amount of time may be 
relatively small it may vary depending on the interface and the type of information being 
communicated. This additional time may be detrimental to the decision-making process 
even if the information is of higher value because the information my no longer be relevant 
or due to lost initiative by acting too slowly.  
If the dominating decision maker is the machine, issues of maintaining a 
comprehensive common operational picture for the other members in the combat 
operations center may become difficult. Again, this will depend on the ability to display 
information to the other humans. This additional communication channel adds to the 
amount of time it takes to gain understanding of the decision, this in turn will affect the 
common operational picture. Furthermore, the machine must be able to explain its rational 
for making the decision it did, as a human would to anyone who did not fully understand 
why the decision was made. This touches on understanding of intent and aligning the focus 
of the staff to meet the desired objective. If a machine cannot understand intent or explain 
its decision it will be very difficult for humans to effectively partners and to adequately 
contribute to obtaining the objective.  
Although this is not a new issue, the ramifications might have gone unnoticed. As 
the general perception is that by processing more information machine teammates begin to 
help humans to make better decisions. However, there is a subtle risk for humans; over 
time, forgetting how to do the original task. This has become more relevant because of an 
over reliance of computers. For example, the autopilot feature now standard on most 
commercial airplanes. In 2007, an experiment was conducted by Matthew Ebbatson with 
a group of airline pilots (Carr, 2014). He concluded “Flying skills decay quite rapidly 
towards the fringes of ‘tolerable’ performance without relatively frequent practice” (Carr, 
2014, p. 3). He calls this effect “skill fade,” but we know it in the military as skill atrophy. 
51 
We have traditionally applied this affect to field skills that require constant maintenance to 
be proficient such as land navigation and marksmanship. This affect is now potentially 
creeping into the command and control domain with processes. If we are not diligent in 
what and how we let machines assist us in decision making, if the machine is unable to 
process information in its normal manner for whatever reason then we may be in for a rude 
awakening. 
This can be further expanded in the sense that by adding machines into the 
command and control system they will be assisting humans by automating the tasks that 
the human used to do. This changes the humans’ tasks to managing the system and 
analyzing the output instead of conducting the task themselves. This introduces a new set 
of skills; as a result, the humans have to be trained to be able to effectively perform their 
task. If we expect humans to maintain proficiency in their primary task and in alternate 
tasks, such as, taking over for the machine. This may lead to an inability to maintain 
acceptable proficiency in certain secondary task. This is sometimes referred to as the law 
of stretched systems (Bradshaw et al., 2013). David Woods and Eric Hollnagel describe it 
as “every system is stretched to operate at its capacity; as soon as there is some 
improvement, for example in the form of new technology, it will be exploited to achieve a 
new intensity and tempo of activity” (Bradshaw et al., 2013, p. 59). By adding a machine 
to the system to offload some work the human used to do we will undoubtedly find new 
work for the human to maximize the capacity of the system. This can become dangers 
because humans have an amazing ability to contextualize information that computers 
currently do not possess. By “speeding up” the processing of information with a machine 
teammate we may be inadvertently removing valuable contextual information for the 
human to make an effective decision. This issue will need to be carefully considered to 
mitigate compromising SA.  
This also points to another issue of automation bias. This basically means that 
humans place too much trust in machines (Laudrain, 2019). Where machines offer great 
potential to sort through larger amount of data and realize patterns hidden to humans, they 
are still following algorithms. These algorithms may have bugs or are not the optimal way 
of conducting the analysis. This presents a problem when the human places too much trust 
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in the system. While trust was not a part of this study, the participants were asked what 
their perceived accuracy of their machine teammate was. The average was 83.89 with a 
low of 6 and a high of 100. A better description would be a histogram (Figure 15). As you 
can see the majority of respondents thought the machine was above 90% accurate. In this 
case they were right, since trust was not of interest in this experiment the machine was right 
100% of the time. To complete the picture, we will compare the averages of all responses 
for the given task. In the decision alone task the participants were correct 49% of the time, 
with the machine teammate 69% of the time. For the Condition only task the participants 
were right 47% of the time. With the machine teammate, again 69%. Compare this to the 
condition decision task. The participants were correct 47% of the time compared to 47% 
with a machine teammate. This suggests participants trusted what the computer 
recommended. One explanation for this is an automation bias.  
 
Figure 15. Perceived Machine Accuracy 
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B. MACHINE INTERACTION AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
As we have seen information gets filtered and analyzed as it moves from raw data 
to understanding. If a human and machine are both presented with the same information 
and each allowed to analyze the information, then interaction with a machine does not 
dramatically affect situational awareness (Figure 13). However, when we allow machines 
to process more information than given to a human, which we have seen a human cannot 
process all available information. The human begins to lose situational awareness (Figure 
14). This is because the human is not able to know what information the machine used in 
its analysis; more importantly all of the available AI/Machine systems are categorized as 
Narrow AI and they are not sensitive to context. This is similar to the same point previously 
stated that as information diminishes to the human they will lose contextual information 
and additionally situational awareness because some of that missing information may be 
critical for the human to understand what the machine is using to make its decision with. 
The problem gets further compounded when machines become so advanced that humans 
are unable to understand how the machine makes a decision. This was previously 
mentioned as a black box system. Then the human must rely on the machine to explain its 
decision which can lead to diminished situational awareness.  
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Figure 16. Situational Awareness Equal Information 
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Figure 17. Situational Awareness Unequal Information 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
There is no question that the amount of data that is generated and collected will 
continue to increase in the future. Humans have a cognitive load capacity to only be able 
to process so much information at once. The point has already been reached where humans 
cannot process the amount of data that is being collected. This suggests that other means 
must be used in order to process the data that is being collected. If this data is not processed 
properly, there is high risk of not realizing vital information and ultimately making a poor 
decision. It should be noted that to aid in this processing of information machine teammates 
will be utilized. It has already been demonstrated that through analyzing large amounts of 
data patterns unrecognizable to humans have been found. While this seems like a 
reasonable response to the flood of data being collected it should be approached with 
caution. Two critical factors to any command and control system are uncertainty and time. 
While processing this data will help to reduce uncertainty, we must remain cognizant that 
we will never lift the fog of war and that it takes time to reduce uncertainty. It may now be 
possibly to keep uncertainty to the lowest levels we have ever seen; however, it will never 
be eliminated. This is because of the time trade off. While machines have superhuman 
capabilities of processing information it still takes time. Additionally, these machines are 
not humans and cannot put things into context. Remember humans still excel at the 
orientation step in the OODA Loop (CNA, 2019). It has been stated that information 
overload can be just as detrimental as too little information and just because we have the 
capability to feed all available information to a decision maker does not necessarily mean 
we should. Furthermore, relinquishing more data processing to machines could potentially 
reduce SA in humans and lead to a poor decision even with increased information. As with 
any major decision the benefits must outweigh the cons. Machines teammates that are able 
to explain their decision-making process and have an interface to maintain team SA have 
potential to tremendously benefit any command and control system.   
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Other research that could be conducted would be to break this experiment into parts 
and focus on that part and manipulate a different variable to see its affect. For example, 
one could focus on the C-D and M-C-D portion and manipulate time (Table 2). Time could 
have three different levels: low, medium, and high. Time could be a critical factor in 
deciding to go with the machines analysis and further reinforcing a potential automation 
bias. Similarly, with the broken-down approach. One could manipulate a different variable 
of complexity in what you are asking the participants do. For instance, the task that you are 
asking the participants to do changes in complexity. The task could be broken down into 
two levels of simple and complex. It would be interesting to see if the level of difficulty 
changes the reliance or the effectiveness of the decision. Furthermore, if you changed the 
design to nearly orthogonal you may be able to combine several of these changes.  
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